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According to a prominent suggestion in the ethics of transcranial neurostimulation
the effects of such devices can be treated as ethically on par with established,
pre-neurotechnological alterations of the mind. This parity allegedly is supported by
situated cognition theories showing how external devices can be part of a cognitive
system. This article will evaluate this suggestion. It will reject the claim, that situated
cognition theories support ethical parity. It will however point out another reason,
why external carriers or modifications of the mental might come to be considered
ethically on par with internal carriers. Section “Why Could There Be Ethical Parity
between Neural Tissue and External Tools?” presents the ethical parity theses between
external and internal carriers of the mind as well as neurotechnological alterations and
established alterations. Section “Extended, Embodied, Embedded: Situated Cognition
as a Relational Thesis” will elaborate the different situated cognition approaches and
their relevance for ethics. It will evaluate, whether transcranial stimulation technologies
are plausible candidates for situated cognition theses. Section “On the Ethical Relevance
of Situated Cognition Theses” will discuss criteria for evaluating whether a cognitive tool
is deeply embedded with a cognitive system and apply these criteria to transcranial
brain stimulation technologies. Finally it will discuss the role diverse versions of situated
cognition theory can play in the ethics of altering mental states, especially the ethics of
transcranial brain stimulation technologies.
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INTRODUCTION
The most widespread ethical concern regarding brain-stimulation technologies, be they invasive or
transcranial, results from their potential of modifying the mind. Brain stimulation technologies
have been likened to traditional psychosurgery, and just like the latter, their success and abuse
already has a history of exaggeration1. The comparison creates an image that does carry.
In order to banish this image and highlight the pressing ethical issues in brain stimulation
technology it has been suggested to treat the effects of such devices as ethically on par
with established, pre-neurotechnological alterations of the mind, such as psychotherapy or
mnemonics (Levy, 2007a,b; Fenton and Alpert, 2008). This parity is allegedly supported by situated
1For an overview of the coverage transcranial stimulation received and the overly strong claims made in that coverage see
(Dubljevic et al., 2014), for the similarity in coverage concerning transcranial stimulation and psychosurgery see (Mashour
et al., 2005)
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cognition theories showing how external devices can be part of a
cognitive system. I will portray these suggestions for revising the
neuroethics of brain stimulation in section Why Could There Be
Ethical Parity between Neural Tissue and External Tools?
It has, however, been doubted whether brain stimulation
really can be seen as a part of a cognitive system, because
it does not in fact fit the criteria of most situated cognition
theories (Walter, 2009), much less the special case of extended
cognition. In section Extended, Embodied, Embedded: Situated
Cognition as a Relational Thesis I’ll elaborate what in situated
cognition approaches has been taken as a means for modifying
the neuroethics of brain stimulation. I’ll point out relevant
limitations for such a use as well.
Drawing on situated cognition approaches, several sets of
criteria for evaluating whether a cognitive tool is deeply
embedded with a cognitive system have been suggested. In
section On the Ethical Relevance of Situated Cognition Theses
I will apply these criteria to transcranial brain stimulation
technologies (tBS) and discuss the role diverse versions of
situated cognition theory can play in the ethics of altering mental
states, especially the ethics of tBS technologies.
WHY COULD THERE BE ETHICAL PARITY
BETWEEN NEURAL TISSUE AND
EXTERNAL TOOLS?
The debate about the role of situated cognition hypotheses
in ethics started with the suggestion that the extended mind
hypothesis might shed new light on neuroethical issues. I’ll go
into the details of situated cognition hypotheses in the next
section, for now let it suffice to say that “situated cognition” is a
collective term for several related paradigms in cognitive science:
embodied cognition, embedded cognition, extended cognition
or mind. They claim that the mind or cognition is dependent
upon or constituted by more than brain tissue and its activity.
In Levy (2007b) Levy claims that given the extended mind thesis
the intuition becomes dubious “that neurological interventions,
whether by way of psychopharmaceuticals, transcranial magnetic
stimulation, or direct brain stimulation, are fundamentally
different from more traditional ways of altering mental states”
(Levy, 2007b, p. 7). It is surprising to see tBS, a technology
which relies on the idea that cognition goes on in the brain and
that by stimulating the brain we can improve cognition brought
into close contact with approaches claiming that cognition
happens not just in the head. Unsurprisingly, these examples,
pharmaceuticals and brain stimulation technology, are not the
focus of any situated cognition theorist. I will try to show that
the neglect of brain stimulation examples in situated cognition
theory has systematic reasons.While I share Levy’s view that there
is equal reason to be concerned about modifications of mental
states independently of the specific vector, I wonder from which
version, if any, of situated cognition this results.
Levy tries to support the case against internalist intuitions
which posit an ethical difference between internal and external
alterations of the mind by pointing not only to the extended
mind hypothesis of Clark and Chalmers (1998), but to versions
of the embodied cognition hypothesis as put forward by Damásio
(1994), as well. He takes Damasio’s neuroscientific results to show
that the “mind extends into the body” (Levy, 2007b, p. 9). In
his book length treatise (Levy, 2007a) he elaborates the claim
of ethical parity between different modifications and carriers of
mental states. He suggests an ethical parity thesis, providing a
strong version, which relies on the theory of extended mind, and
a weak version which makes use of the embedded mind theory
only. These versions read:
EPP (strong): Since the mind extends into the external
environment, alterations of external props used for thinking
are (ceteris paribus) ethically on a par with alterations of the
brain.
EPP (weak): Alterations of external props are (ceteris paribus)
ethically on a par with alterations of the brain, to the precise
extent to which our reasons for finding alterations of the brain
problematic are transferable to alterations of the environment
in which it is embedded (Levy, 2007a, p. 61).
As can be seen in the formulation of these two versions,
the difference between different situated cognition approaches,
i.e., extended mind and embedded cognition, finds explicit
consideration. While Levy himself accepts the extended mind
hypothesis and thus strong EPP, he is willing to settle for
the weaker version in his discussion of neuroethical issues
throughout the book2. Note however, that Levy’s preferred
version, EPP (strong) is enthymematic. It requires an additional
premise, which might read “all contributors to the workings of a
mind are on par with regard to their moral value, e.g., claim to
protection” or “alterations to any contributor to the workings of
the mind are ethically on par.” I prefer the former formulation as
it highlights the moral value of external contributors to the mind,
which situated cognition hypotheses are employed to support.
The latter formulation is equivalent but highlights the moral
standing of the alterations of said contributors. Without such
a premise the argument would not be valid. I hope to show
that there are serious reasons to doubt this hidden premise. EPP
(weak) in contrast is not in need of an additional premise as
it already contains the requirement that our moral reasons are
transferable.
The parity principle is explicitly introduced with regard to
psychopharmaceuticals and brain stimulation technologies and
applies to all neurotechnologies in Levy’s monograph3. In a later
article Levy is considerably more careful in picking his examples.
He explicitly states that the extended mind hypothesis is driven
by new technologies, such as “brain-computer interfaces which
expand their users’ cognitive powers” but concedes that “it may
2For a detailed discussion of Levy’s EPP see (DeMarco and Ford, 2014). DeMarco
and Ford suggest an even weaker form of EPP, which I will not include in the
following argument for the sake of brevity.
3One might read this as a global attack against neuroethics: If neurotechnologies
are ethically on par with established technologies and the additional risks
of neurotechnologies are ethically no different from those of other medical
operations, then one might think that the ethical principles which stood the test
of time in evaluating established technologies in combination with the bioethical
principles are sufficient to evaluate new neurotechnologies as well. Levy obviously
does not read his argument this way.
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be that the kinds of technology envisaged here prove to be beyond
the capabilities of science for the foreseeable future” (Levy, 2011,
p. 287 f.).
In parallel to Levy’s contributions, Joel Anderson formulated
a similar claim namely “that the supposition that the skin-
and-skull barrier is a relevant ethical watershed [...] involves
bad metaphysics, and it has unacceptable ethical implications”
(Anderson, 2008, p. 264)4. Anderson’s primary focus is on
prosthesis and tools used by persons with disabilities and in
possible cases of enhancement. His use of enhancement examples
transports an additional thesis he shares with Levy: neither the
skin-and-skull barrier nor the therapy-enhancement distinction
carry ethical weight. Rather the technologies in question need to
be evaluated according to independent ethical criteria.
Anderson’s version of a parity principle claims that two
technological props are ceteris paribus ethically on par, if
they are experientially equally transparent and functionally
equivalent (Anderson, 2008, p. 266; but see the discussion of
complementarity and functional eqivalence below). Whether
they are located inside or outside the user’s body does not play
a significant ethical role. In arguing for this parity principle,
Anderson takes recourse to situated cognition approaches, just
as Levy does. It is, however, not clear which version of these
approaches he relies on, as his position is compatible with the
thesis of embodied cognition, embedded cognition as well as
with the extended mind thesis in content and formulations. He
refers to a person’s cognitive processes as embodied (p. 262, 265),
embedded (p. 264)5 or extended (p. 264 f.).
Although Anderson does not explicitly claim ethical parity
between unmodified biological carriers of cognition and
technological functional equivalents, this thesis seems to follow
from his further arguments. He insists that we do not respect
the embodiment of a person but the person herself. Accordingly,
he would probably accept a stronger parity thesis, to the effect
that any two carriers of cognitive processes are ceteris paribus
ethically on par, if they are experientially equally transparent
and functionally equivalent. According to this version of a parity
thesis it does not matter whether the two carriers of cognitive
processes are technological props or biological tissue.
Both Levy and Anderson deny that the distinction “inside
the body/outside the body” per se has ethical relevance. Neither
of them claims, however, that the risks associated with invasive
procedures are ethically irrelevant. Both rightly insist on the
opposite: if the same effect can be realized by a low risk procedure
or a high risk procedure, which most invasive procedures are
cases of, the prior is ethically preferable.
The consequences of these ethical parity theses for the ethics of
neurotechnologies might be extensive. Would they for example
imply that taking away Otto’s famous notebook (Clark and
Chalmers, 1998, see below, chapter 2.2) and destroying the part
4Prior manuscripts of Anderson’s paper date to 2007.
5Anderson takes causal dependence to be the criterion, which makes external
carriers of cognition part of a system, which solves cognitive tasks: “Since I cannot
do the arithmetic without the paper and pencil (or calculator), it seems clear that
they are essential parts of whatever system it is that is doing the long division.” (p.
264) This description is compatible with embedded cognition approaches as well
as with the extended mind hypothesis.
of the brain that still remembers to use the notebook are ethically
on par? Do we have to infer that covering the papers you are
doing sums on and virtual lesioning of your calculating brain by
TMS are? Doubting that conclusion is at least possible. Below I
will not just elaborate why situated cognition theses do not give
rise to ethical parity but also why ethical parity is at best a rare
exception. But first let me provide a short but telling example
of how the ethical parity theses have been received and used in
bioethical deliberation.
The Reception of the Parity Thesis in
Ethical Deliberation
The ethical parity thesis has found extended application in
its authors’ own work, especially in Levy’s introductory book
Neuroethics. It has made an impact in a wide range of
neuroethical articles, but finds only little explicit mention. For
example, soon after Levy’s work, Fenton and Alpert suggested
that a specific case of neurotechnology should be considered
as a part of the extended mind of its user and be ethically
evaluated as such: Brain Computer Interfaces (BCI) for locked-in
syndrome.While the example of neurotechnology is dissimilar to
the technologies discussed in the present article, their reference to
the parity principle and situated cognition approaches is typical
for the debate.
Fenton and Alpert do refer to Levy’s discussion of the
extended mind hypothesis but not to the parity principle. Like
Levy’s, their reliance on situated cognition hypotheses is fairly
inclusive. Unlike Levy they do not intend it as a forceful
endorsement of some sort of situated cognition hypothesis.
Rather they use situated cognition theories to modify a common
perspective on technologies which closely interact with the
(human) brain: “As with other embodied or embedded theories
of cognition, extended mind theory can be regarded as a
lens through which we learn to re-see particular aspects of
human cognitive engagement with the relevant physical or social
environment” (Fenton and Alpert, 2008, p. 126).
Their ethical conclusion on the moral value of BCIs follows
established paths of bioethical enquiry. Rather than discussing
whether BCIs should be treated as having the same moral value
as biological means of cognition and motion, they focus on
questions of informed consent in BCI surgery and distributional
issues, namely society’s duty to provide access to BCIs for persons
in need of such. Their suggestion that such a societal duty exists,
is presented as following from the improvements in autonomy
and quality of life that persons with locked-in syndrome can gain
from BCIs. Thus, the ethical parity thesis does not play any role
in their argument.
Although Fenton and Alpert explicitly refer to situated
cognition theses, these do not play an irreplaceable role in their
discussion, either. The central reason for guaranteeing access
to BCIs and for adapting a slightly modified informed consent
procedure for BCIs Fenton and Alpert provide is the gain in
autonomy of patients. This gain in autonomy, including the
extended action space, or so they claim, changes the “self-nature”
of the person. But one does not need to quote the extended
mind hypothesis to establish that individuals with broader action
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space and more autonomy will lead different lives, think different
thoughts and perform different actions. And neither does the
evaluation that more autonomy and a broader action space are
better for the person in question rely on the extended mind
hypothesis. The only argumentative role it plays is to make
these changes in the patient’s characteristics a part of his “self-
nature,” but that in turn does not carry any argumentative weight.
Fenton and Alpert’s results are sound without them making any
argumentative use of either situated cognition theses or of the
parity thesis.
In a direct reaction to Fenton and Alpert, Walter (2009) took
care to differentiate the alternative versions of situated cognition
hypotheses and demonstrated that BCIs for locked-in syndrome
are not a case of extended cognition6. I suggest something
similar is true for tBS. Walter rightly insists that ethical analysis,
such as Fenton and Alpert’s often do not require the use of
situated cognition hypotheses. If, however, ethicists refer to such
hypotheses, they should make their argumentative role very clear,
and avoid the suspicion of mere window-dressing.
EXTENDED, EMBODIED, EMBEDDED:
SITUATED COGNITION AS A RELATIONAL
THESIS
It is a family of innovative paradigms in cognitive science that the
abovementioned authors base their ethical claims on. In order
to evaluate whether these paradigms can support ethical claims
beyondmere window-dressing, some in depth exposition of their
structure is required. As mentioned, “situated cognition” is the
collective term for different theses claiming that cognition and
other mental processes can only be explained with regard to
their bodily or environmental situatedness. The most common
versions of situated cognition are embodied cognition, embedded
cognition, extended mind, and enactivism. The various versions
of situated cognition as new paradigms in cognitive science
typically resulted from dissatisfaction with certain characteristics
of the representational, computational paradigm in so called
standard cognitive science (Shapiro, 2011). The reception as a
metaphysical thesis in the philosophy of mind is secondary to
that7. Its role in neuroethics, as it will turn out in the following, is
even more modest.
Most versions of situated cognition theses have been put
forward in the form of predications of “mind” or “cognition,”
e.g., “extended mind,” “embedded cognition.” What these
6Walter claims that BCI might at best be discussed under the paradigm of enacted
cognition I take enacted cognition or enactivism to be a close relative of situated
cognition hypothesis. It claims that cognition always is enacted by an embodied
cognitive system in and with its environment. Thus it combines the embodiment
and embeddedness thesis, but goes beyond those in requiring that the cognitive
system in some waymakes sense of the relation between itself and the environment
in the performance of cognitive processes (cf. e.g., Hutto, 2008, 2013). The reason
why enactivism is not discussed in this article is simple: it has a strong anti-
cognitivist flavor. Enactivism at least in its more radical strands tries to reduce
cognitive processes to simple, where possible motoric and perceptual, routines.
7This critical note can be found in Levy’s own work: “I also suggested that nothing
of great moment depends, for our purposes, on whether it or its less radical rival,
the embedded mind hypothesis, is true.” (Levy, 2007a, p. 308) It is mirrored in the
contributions of e.g., Sterelny (2010), Sutton (Sutton et al., 2010) and others.
predications highlight is a relation between cognitive processes
and complex organisms in an environment. One can thus
differentiate the versions of situated cognition according to two
dimensions: the type of relation and the relata. The relations
between cognitive agent and their embeddings which are most
commonly taken to hold, are dependency and constitution. The
focus on organisms and their environment can vary strongly in
scope. It can stop at the bodily limits of the organism, include
his direct physical environment or even include his social and
cultural embedding. Qua ethical parity thesis all of them would
be candidates for moral value on par with that of our biological
make-up. The varying scope of relata gives rise to one of the main
desiderata of situated cognition hypotheses:
D.: Situated cognition approaches need to determine the limits
of how far cognition / the mind extends in space and time.
Because situational factors are not merely candidates for being
part of the human mind but qua parity thesis for equal moral
status as our biological makeup, this desideratum is one of ethical
theory as much as of cognitive science. In this chapter I will first
provide an overview of the different versions of situated cognition
theses (2.1), then I will disentangle the relations put forward in
the different versions (2.2) and finally turn to the relata (2.3).
A Taxonomy of Situated Cognition Theses
The overview of the main versions of situated cognition
hypotheses will cover embodied, embedded and extended
cognition theses. Enactivism does not play a role in the current
debate about ethical parity.
The thesis of embodied cognition highlights that the cognitive
processes of humans (and other animals) can only be explained
as either dependent upon or partially constituted by extracranial
bodily processes. Walter introduces Embodied Cognition I and
II and distinguishes them by the relation between cognitive
processes and extracranial bodily processes. To make the latter
difference obvious:
“Embodied Cognition I (EC-I): Cognitive processes are partially
dependent upon extracranial bodily processes” (Walter, 2009, p.
63). “Embodied Cognition II (EC-II): Cognitive processes are
partially constituted by extracranial bodily processes” (Walter,
2009, p. 64).
The embodiment thesis has historically been a reaction to an
alleged tendency to ignore the role of the body in explaining
cognition, shown by the cognitive sciences under the sway of
the computational metaphor8. It has for example been claimed,
8Recent suggestions, however, cast doubt on the assumption that
computationalism and the embodiment thesis are mutually exclusive. In
fact, from a computational perspective, the spread of the computational hardware
is not limited in principle (Wilson, 1994), and from an embodiment perspective
nothing speaks against identifying the processes of the wider human body as
computational processes.
A distinction of situated cognition theses similar to Walter’s is made by Shapiro,
who takes the viable embodiment programs to either be a case of replacement or of
constitution. It should be noticed that Shapiro’s discussion of embodied cognition
includes theoretical approaches typically subsumed under embedded or extended
cognition theories, namely the dependency or constitution of cognitive processes
by extrabodily components (Shapiro, 2011).
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that visual perception is much closer integrated with bodily
movement and bodily feedback, such as change of perspective
and grasping behavior than the computational model was able
to explain (Hurley, 1998; Noë, 2004).
The thesis of embedded cognition connects to that of embodied
cognition type I and extends (no pun intended) one relatum of
the dependency relation. It emphasizes that cognitive processes
depend on extrabodily components or processes. Here is Walter’s
definition:
“Embedded Cognition (EMC): Cognitive processes are partially
dependent upon extrabodily processes” (Walter, 2009, p. 64).
Embedded cognition approaches have been brought forth against
the representational paradigm of standard cognitive science
rather than against computationalism. They intended to show
that representations are not necessary in explaining even prime
examples of apparently representation-dependent tasks, such as
spatial navigation9.
Finally, the thesis of the extended mind extends the relatum
as before, from bodily to extrabodily processes and replaces
the dependency relation by a constitution relation. Extended
cognition approaches are well supported by, if not dependent
on, embodiment approaches and vice versa. Thus, the separate
treatment in the above and following passages is intended for
analytic clarity, not to give the impression of mutually exclusive
alternative positions. According to the thesis of,
“Extended Cognition (EXC): Cognitive processes are partially
constituted by extrabodily processes” (Walter, 2009, p. 65).
While several variations of the extended cognition or extended
mind hypothesis have been suggested (e.g., Rowlands, 1999), the
most prominent version is that of Clark and Chalmers (1998).
What makes their version one of the most ambitious is that they
extend their claim to the mind in general, explicitly not limiting
it to cognitive processes.
On the basis of this short overview of situated cognition
theses, I will be able to differentiate between two types of moral
value, primary and derivative, which technological systems for
the support or modification of the mind, such as transcranial
stimulation technologies might have. In order to do so I will need
two additional conceptual clarifications. If the different situated
cognition and situated mind approaches just presented are read
as relational theses, we should be clear about two questions: (1)
what exactly is it that is extended, embedded, embodied? This
question targets the relata. And (2) what exactly is this relation
of dependence or constitution? This question targets the relation.
I’ll provide my understanding of the latter question first and then
turn to the more crucial, former question.
9According to embedded cognition theorists, the cognitive load allegedly caused
by representations can be reduced by relying on the world as its own model.
Embedded cognition theories owe a lot to the robotics program of Brooks (1991),
who designed several of his early robotic systems as artefactual replies to the early
artificial intelligence program, even in their names. Brooks’ robotics program,
apart from setting trends in robotics, highlights the compatibility of different
situated cognition approaches.
The Relations: Constitution, Dependency,
and the Risk of Explanatory and Ethical
Bloat
As mentioned the aim of investigating the structure of situated
cognition theses here is to evaluate whether they justify
treating transcranial stimulation technologies as ethically on par
with our biological constituents of the mind. It will make a
relevant difference in evaluating any technological support or
modification of mental processes whether the former can be
understood as real parts of the cognitive agent, as a necessary
scaffold of an agent’s cognitive processes or as mere tools of
cognition. This difference in turn strongly depends on what
one takes constitution and dependency to be, and how far the
constitution or conditions of cognition extend.
I take “dependency” to refer to a causal, difference-making
relation. Both embodied and embedded cognition theories want
to claim that the body or the environment have an indispensable
causal role in cognition. They cannot be content with any less
ambitious claim according to which the body or environment
are some non-causal condition for cognition. Causal dependency
is for the present purpose captured sufficiently in the INUS-
conditions following Mackie (1965). “Constitution,” on the
other hand, will in the following be understood as a relation
which obtains between wholes and the sum of their parts
and the relations between those parts10. Even this minimal
characterization will suffice to clarify the difference between
causal dependence and constitution and elucidate how this
difference plays out in the parity principle.
First, constitution is a relation between entities that are not
wholly distinct, such as parts and a whole, or the material
and its form as e.g., between an amount of bronze and a
bronze-statue. Causal dependency on the other hand, typically
is a relation between fully distinct entities. Because of this
difference it would seem that only constitution-based accounts,
i.e., Embodied Cognition II and Extended Mind can consider
external props as proper parts of the mind or of cognition. The
strong parity principle explicitly claims that the mind “extends
into the external environment,” i.e., has proper parts which are
located in the external environment. This strong parity principle
is thus supported by the constitution-based situated cognition
theses only. Dependency based accounts on the other handwould
have to claim that external props can be ethically on par although
they are not a proper part of our cognitive makeup.
Second, constitution is a non-causal, synchronous relation
and therefore not suited for any successional relation, which
we take causation to be. This difference affects the ethical
parity thesis insofar as a constitution-based account can include
10Constitution has been the focus of a long debate raging over different contexts,
from personal identity to mechanistic explanation (Baker, 2000; Craver, 2009).
I’ll follow Carl Gillett in his characterization of constitution as “(c)ompositional
relations” i.e “non-causal determination relations that are synchronous, involve
entities that are not wholly distinct and do not involve the transfer of energy
and/ormediation of force. Scientific relations of composition are also (b) transitive,
asymmetric and irreflexive and (c) many-one relations with teams of many
components and one composed entity.“ (Gillett, 2013, p. 317) Gillett provides
a much more detailed discussion of constitution, focused on explanation in the
sciences.
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synchronous extra-neural processes as parts of the cognitive
agent only. Causal dependency claims can integrate a larger
set of bodily or extrabodily processes into their analysis of
cognition or the mind: processes preceding the cognitive or
mental processes, their causes. The hypotheses of Embodied
Cognition II and Extended Mind will have to limit themselves to
bodily or extrabodily processes simultaneous to the intracranial
events co-constituting cognitive processes11.
Taken these two differences together the best candidates for
ethical parity are bodily or extrabodily processes simultaneous to
the intracranial events, which according to Embodied Cognition
II or Extended Mind co-constitute cognitive processes. Many
cases of TBS seem to be part of this candidate group. Especially
tDCS, but inmany cases TMS as well, is employed simultaneously
to the performance of a cognitive task in experimental settings
as well as in lay use (Wexler, 2016). As several studies report
that task performance is different, sometimes even superior to
non-stimulation, it could be inferred that neural processes plus
stimulation co-constitute the cognitive process in question.
The Relata: Mind and Cognition, a
Processual Reading
The analysis of the relations suggested in situated cognition
theses has made it possible to limit the scope of possible
embeddings and proper parts of the mind or of cognition and
thus identify candidates for the ethical parity theses. A parallel
analysis of the relata will enable us to limit the types of possible
extensions of cognition. Whether modifications of cognitive
processes via either stimulation of neural processes, external
cognitive tools, such as pen and paper in multiplication or
external carriers of information are possible candidates depends
on how we understand the terms “mind” and “cognition.”
While I clearly cannot provide anything like a definition of
“mind” or “cognition” in this article, it is crucial to highlight
one variation in the use of the terms: “mind” and “cognition”
11One reason why authors in situated cognition theory exclude technological
artefacts is to stop a reductio argument against the situated cognition theses,
called cognitive bloat. The cognitive bloat argument claims that once one accepts
external carriers of cognition as part of the mind, there is no bar to extending
the mind even further, and soon one will have to accept every accessible book,
website, possible social interaction etc. as part of the individual’s mind. As this is
absurd, one had better not even take the first step and reject the extension thesis
altogether. With a broad scope of external parts of the mind it would be at least
extremely difficult to give a unified account of all the different components of a
mind so understood. The term would simply refer to seemingly unrelated stuff.
The same broad understanding of situated cognition raises a similar problem for
approaches using a dependency account. Widening the perspective by including
too much of the causal history of a cognitive process will make it increasingly
difficult to find unified explanations. For a paradigm intended to provide greater
unity to explanations of cognition, this would be unfortunate. This has been
brought forward as a critique to situated cognition theories in general: extending
the explanandum cognition‘beyond what goes on in the brain will make it harder
or even impossible to find an unified, scientific theory (Rupert, 2004; Adams
and Aizawa, 2008). The argument is peculiar: not only is it one of the infamous
arguments from the future progress of science, rather it tailors the phenomena to
some future theory instead of tailoring the theory to the phenomena. Levy provides
a detailed discussion of this issue in his (Levy, 2007a, p. 48 f.), pointing to existing
scientific theories of very divers phenomena. But see the reply in (Adams and
Aizawa, 2010) as well.
are mostly used either for a set of processes or for some non-
processual elements of a thinking being. This distinction can be
found in common dictionaries12, as well as in philosophical and
scientific approaches to the mind.
Note that Walter’s definitions above refer to processes in
the case of cognition as well as its bodily carriers, it does
not refer to objects or states in either case. Thus, according
to Walter, the primary terms of situated cognition approaches
cannot be “belief,” “emotion,” “memory,” or “retina,” “cochlea,”
but rather “believe,” “feel,” “remember,” “activate,” “detect” etc. I
share Walter’s ontological choice, and will try to show why this
formulation is superior to alternative formulations, which could
for example have been: “Cognitive states are partially dependent
upon extracranial bodily states,” or more generally: “Cognition is
partially dependent upon extracranial bodily components.” The
main reason for deciding for a processual reading is, that it can
steer clear of the following problem. In a non-processual reading
of the extended mind hypothesis it might make sense to crack the
following joke:
Question: Why did the pencil think that 2+2=4?
Clark’s Answer: Because it was coupled to the mathematician.
(Adams and Aizawa, 2010, p. 67).
Adams and Aizawa have famously put forward the coupling
constitution fallacy case against the extended mind hypothesis,
which gives rise to above joke. The fallacy consists in identifying
two separate objects bringing about an effect together as one
system bringing about the effect. The object in question are
the mathematician and the pencil, the effect “thinking that
2+2=4.” The coupling-constitution fallacy indeed looms, if we
read “mind” or “cognition” as some non-processual elements
of a thinking being and insist that some external objects are
on par with intracranial elements in constituting the mind13.
The aim of the joke, Clark as well as Chalmers, often do use
formulations which make it seem very much as if they were
suggesting exactly this: that external objects are on par with
intracranial objects in constituting the further entity mind, and
that accordingly, mental states occur in both of these objects
alike. The most prominent example is Otto’s notebook. In their
original contribution introducing the extended mind theory
Clark and Chalmers introduce the example of Otto and his
notebook. Otto suffers from a memory problem (inadequately
dubbed Alzheimer’s Disease) preventing him frommaking use of
declarative memories. He uses a notebook instead to gain, store
and use information which healthy persons would retrieve from
neuraly realized memory (Clark and Chalmers, 1998). In some
12The Merriam Webster for example gives three definitions of the noun, mind’
as used in this context: (a) the element or complex of elements in an individual
that feels, perceives, thinks, wills, and especially reasons, (b) the conscious
mental events and capabilities in an organism, (c) the organized conscious and
unconscious adaptive mental activity of an organism. Definition a refers to a
non-processual, b and c to an processual conception of, mind’.
13Even then, the joke has a taste of a mereological fallacy (cf. Bennett and Hacker,
2003): it is not the case that a part of a system can be assigned the same properties
as the complete system, e.g., it is not the case that the brain thinks, just because
persons with a brain think.
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formulations it sounds as if the individual entries in the notebook
are more or less the same as individual memories realized in a
healthy person’s neural tissue. An ethical parity thesis based on
this understanding would claim that Otto’s notebook has moral
value, because mental states occur in it, i.e., the individual entries
are (or are equivalent to) memories.
This interpretation, according to which the notebook is a
self-contained realizer of memory, would seem to ignore that
the entries in Otto’s notebook have a purely derivative cognitive
role owed to the notebook being coupled to the cognitive agent.
Counter to those formulations of Clark and Chalmers, on a
processual reading of “mind” the notebook’s entries should not
be understood as individual memories, but carriers of a process
of remembering. Remembering, however, is not something that
occurs in the notebook and neither is the computation 2+2=4
something that occurs in the pencil.
If we take Clark, Chalmers and others to refer to the mind or
cognition as sets of processes, the coupling-constitution fallacy
does not loom anymore. This is why Shapiro brought forward
the charge of a process-constituent fallacy against Adams and
Aizawa: “the assumption that those who defend X as a constituent
of process Y must believe that process Y occurs in X” (Shapiro,
2011, p. 181).
The procedural reading does, however, have a major influence
for the role of the extended mind hypothesis in neuroethics.
According to the preferred processual reading, we cannot
simply say that Otto’s notebook is worthy of protection because
memories occur in it. In general it will not do to base ethical
inference on the claim that some state occurs in some extracranial
or even extrabodily object, even if the ethical inference itself
would be sound. This result thus casts doubt on the inference
from an extended mind hypothesis to an ethical parity thesis and
requires us to think about the ethical relevance of the situated
cognition hypothesis anew. Taken together with the result that
only processes simultaneous to the cognition to be explained are
suited as proper parts of the cognitive agent, the role of situated
cognition approaches seems to contract rapidly.
ON THE ETHICAL RELEVANCE OF
SITUATED COGNITION THESES
One obvious caveat in evaluating the ethical relevance of situated
cognition theses is that we cannot simply move from cognitive
to ethical parity (or disparity) theses and vice versa. As just
shown it does not immediately follow from the alleged fact that
extrabodily processes are constituents of cognitive processes on
par with intracranial processes, that they are on par with regard
to some moral value, e.g., protection requirements. From the
mere fact that Otto’s notebook is a carrier of his remembering,
it neither follows that memories occur in his notebook14 nor
14A good example for this–tomymind dubious–inference can be found in (Sutton,
2010, p. 195): “When extended from cognitive processes to cognitive states, it also
then animates the stronger claim that the standing information in the notebook
counts as cognitive even when it’s not in use, because it functions in relevant
respects just as do the standing, non-occurrent beliefs and memories in Inga’s
brain.”
that his notebook is as worthy of protection as his neural
tissue is. The argument is at best enthymematic as shown
initially. On the other hand: neither does it simply follow from
an alleged fact that extracranial bodily processes are not co-
constituents of cognitive processes, that they are not on par with
regard to some moral value, e.g., the claim to bodily integrity.
Neither an externalist metaphysical thesis, the extended mind
hypothesis, nor an internalist one, the original internal/external
distinction, is sufficient for an ethical conclusion. While it is
plausible that all constituents of a person’s mental life are morally
worth of protection, they might well have different protection
requirements. And while it is plausible that manipulations of a
person’s brain give cause for special moral concern, it definitely
does not follow, that other manipulations of her body might not
be just as problematic, in some cases even more so.
The theoretical distance between situated cognition theses and
ethical parity can be demonstrated with one of the frequently
used examples. The mere fact that something facilitates or even
enables some cognitive process is not a strong indicator for
any positive moral value. Take Clark and Chalmers’ example
of the Tetris support module, no matter whether external or
implanted. They ask their reader to imagine an agent sitting
in front of a computer screen, trying to predict whether some
two-dimensional shapes fit the depicted sockets, i.e., they ask
readers to imagine someone playing Tetris (Clark and Chalmers,
1998, p. 8). They provide three methods for the agent: mental
rotation of the two-dimensional shapes alone, choice of mental
rotation or rotation on the screen, and using a neural implant,
which can perform the rotation as fast as the computer. Those
three procedures all realize the cognitive process of “rotation.”
Should they be functionally equivalent, they are candidates for
the ethical parity thesis. And they might well be functionally
equivalent: the player can decide to train his mental rotation
skills until he beats a less well trained but externally supported or
implant-carrying player in one out of ever two games. But why,
most ethicists will ask, should a gadget enabling us to better play
some computer game have any relevant moral value? There are
already special gaming mice and keyboards, sometimes tailored
to a specific game. We would not claim that e.g., a special World
of Warcraft programmable multibutton mouse has special moral
value, because I can solve rotation and navigation of virtual
characters faster and more reliably with it, maybe even as fast
and reliably as a well-trained and 30 year younger player can
with a plain old two button mouse and keyboard. If someone had
the idea to implant such a device it would hardly gain in moral
value. On the other hand, every gamer’s neural tissue, which does
enable him amongst other things to navigate virtual characters,
has special moral value as a part of an end-in-itself human being’s
body, capable of happiness and suffering.
Have a similar look at a famous example for embedded
cognition: Clark takes up work from McBeath et al. (1995),
which explains how outfielders align their movement in order to
catch fly balls. He describes how the outfielder does not bother
with complex computations of his and the balls trajectory, but
rather aligns his visual tracking and his movement until the ball
appears to move in a straight line from his perspective. Clark
concludes that the solution of the outfielder’s tasks is to “maintain
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a kind of adaptively potent equilibrium that couples the agent
and the world together” (Clark, 1999, p. 346). Neither Clark,
Levy, Anderson nor anybody else would however—or so I hope—
assign the fly ball a moral value even remotely similar to that of
the outfielder’s arms, legs, or visual and motor cortex.
Thus, situated cognition hypotheses are not sufficient to
establish a general ethical parity claim. Neither are they necessary
for ethical parity to hold in some cases. Situated cognition
approaches can still shed light on the relevance—causal as well
as ethical—of extracranial props in human cognition. One will,
however, have to take a closer look at the specific external prop
or carrier of cognition, in order to establish whether it might be
ethically on par with intracranial carriers, have derivative or even
no moral value at all.
In the following I will try to provide criteria for such an
analysis. First, I’ll go into the ways of distinguishing whether
a certain prop or tool can reasonably be considered part of
an extended mind, a part of the cognitive scaffold or a mere
tool (3.1). I will then show that situated cognition approaches
do not allow us to differentiate whether the ethical value of
some extracranial carrier or modifier of cognition is original or
derivative (3.2). In support of that I’ll demonstrate how even
the cognitive role of most technological tools including tBS
are —counter to the demands of the ethical parity thesis—not
functionally equivalent, but rather functionally complementary
(3.3). As complementary carriers of cognitive processes, even
their cognitive role typically is derivative of that of our biological
make-up. In conclusion I will provide a criterion which is suited
to distinguish between primary and derivative moral value of
carriers of cognition as well as providing support the criteria
established in 3.1 to distinguish between tools, scaffolds and
proper parts of cognition (3.4).
Based on these criteria it turns out that several cognitive
and neurotechnologies which have been considered part of an
extended cognition are better described asmere tools or scaffolds,
though it is still plausible to assign them a relevant moral value.
Mind-Extension, Scaffold, or Mere Tool?
As detailed above, situated cognition theories, with the possible
exception of Clark and Chalmers’ version of the extended mind
hypothesis, were not originally targeting cognitive technologies.
Brain stimulation technologies did not feature even in Clark
and Chalmers’ version. It is not at all clear, whether cognitive
technologies are best described as a proper part of the extended
mind, a part of the mind’s scaffold or as a mere tool.
From early on authors of situated cognition theses have been
acutely aware that one needs to distinguish mere tools, external
scaffolds of cognition and external carriers of cognitive processes.
The difference has been marked by Clark and Chalmers, by
what later came to be known as “glue and trust,” that external
carriers of cognition have a set of distinctive characteristics
distinguishing them from mere tools. Their requirements can be
summarized as the external carriers of cognition being a constant
in the person‘s life, being directly available without difficulty,
their information becoming automatically endorsed by the user
and having been consciously endorsed prior to that (Clark
and Chalmers, 1998). Others have developed further criteria or
dimensions of integration between cognitive agent and external
carriers. Sutton et al. for example present a dimensional analysis
integrating reliability, durability and the criteria of glue and trust
as presented by Clark and Chalmers (Sutton et al., 2010). Menary
adds dimensions of manipulation and transformation (Menary,
2010).
In a number of recent articles Heersmink (2015) has taken up
the debate about “glue and trust” and provided an extensive set
of criteria which are meant to distinguish parts of the extended
mind from scaffolds and maybe even mere tools. He suggests
evaluating a cognitive artifact on the following dimensions:
(1) information flow, (2) reliability, (3) durability, (4) trust,
(5) procedural transparency, (6) informational transparency,
(7) individualization, and (8) transformation. Some of these
dimensions seem to be custom made for fairly specific cases of
modern digital lifestyle appliances i.e., wearables, smartphones
and tablets. Especially information flow, trust and informational
transparency, criteria designed for tools and props containing
representational information, are of limited use for scaffolds
and props which are not even intended to carry information,
such as brain stimulation technologies or pharmaceuticals (cf.
Heersmink, 2015, p. 583 f. and 589 f.).
When evaluating new neurotechnologies, especially brain
stimulation technologies, these criteria should give us pause.
Remember that our investigation started, because according
to Levy and others “[a]ccepting the extended mind thesis [...]
requires us to reject [...] that interventions into the brain are
uniquely and distinctively interventions into the mental states
that constitute our identities” (Levy, 2007b, p. 7). Rather they are
qua extended mind hypothesis on par, ethically and functionally,
with “using traditional psychological methods, which range from
talk therapy to the complex experimental manipulations of social
and cognitive psychologists” (Levy, 2007b, p. 7). Based on the
above criteria, however, it is highly dubious whether current
technologies for transcranially intervening in the brain are cases
of situated cognition at all:
As mentioned, the criteria information flow, trust15
and informational transparency are not applicable to brain
stimulation devices. Although those can affect the information
processing and maybe even information retrieval of a subject,
this is—at present—not an intended nor a reproducible effect of
these technologies. This is one obvious difference between brain
stimulation technologies—as they exist today and in foreseeable
future—and several other modifications of the mind: brain
stimulation technologies are not content evaluable16.
On the remaining dimensions as discussed by Heersmink,
tBS technologies typically score fairly low. Note that the
following evaluation refers to transcranial stimulation only; other
stimulation neurotechnologies, especially therapeutic Deep Brain
Stimulations and Vagus Nerve Stimulation, are much better
15“Trust” is introduced as trust in the device’s information. One could reinterpret
it as trust in the device’s effect at best. That, however, does not seem to catch the
particular cognitive role of external devices.
16Both, TMS and tDCS can enhance language performance including semantic
processing (Andoh et al., 2006), word associations (Bridgers and Delaney, 1989)
or picture naming (Cappa et al., 2002; Sparing et al., 2008). As has been well
known for decades, electric cortex.stimulation can elicit the retrieval of contentful
memories, not however generate new contentful states nor selectively activate
specific contents, unless by replicating prior chance findings (Penfield, 1958).
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candidates for mind extensions. Should these fail the test for
inclusion into the extended mind, then because their effects are
less cognitive than motoric.
While several lay users claim otherwise, the effects of
current transcranial stimulations are fairly minimal and
strongly dependent on precise circumstances, ideally laboratory
circumstances (Horvath et al., 2014). While current research
into—not with—tDCS and TMS aims at creating a reliable
manipulation of cognitive and other mental states (cf. Heinrichs,
2012) current reliability is comparatively low.
Brain stimulation technologies are not a constant in a person’s
life, not even her or his cognitive life. Rather, current stimulation
technologies are used in rare occasions only. Furthermore, a
constant use is explicitly advised against by the relevant expert
consensus statements (Rossi et al., 2009). While it is possible
that some lay users exaggerate their use of tDCS, we have yet to
see people constantly using any such tool. Thus, uses of brain
stimulation technologies—at least transcranial ones—typically
are of limited duration and repetition.
Current stimulation technologies are extremely cumbersome
to use, making them rank really low on procedural transparency.
Effective TMS devices are bulky, require quite some energy and
most of all, require a fixed targeting system. Ideally, TMS is
applied stereotactically after the target area has been identified by
a MRI scan and correction for deviation between standard brain
models and the individual brain. tDCS-devices are admittedly
much smaller and require less energy, but to realize a measurable
and specific effect, one needs at least to securely place electrodes
on the scalp and limit the scalps conductance by keeping it
clean and free from sweat and hair. Identifying a correct target
area again is not as simple as it sometimes is depicted. As
individual brains differ, the likelihood of realizing the desired
effect decreases dramatically if no MRI scan and appropriate
computation of loci is present. As movement is detrimental to
stable electrode positioning, the whole process needs to take
place in a nearly immobile state. The procedural transparency
of sticking electrodes on your scalp and keeping immobile is far
fromwhat one would require of a part of the extendedmind, even
of the normal embedding of a cognitive agent.
The criteria of individualization and transformation are
not easily applied. While in the times of tDCS-tinkering the
individualization of self-made devices is extremely high, this is
more an effect of the manufacturing infrastructure and less one
of adoption to one’s individual needs. While the stimulation
program especially of TMS can be adapted to the individual’s
physiology and reaction, this is not a case of individualizing the
device, but rather of using task-adequate settings. We would not
consider a coffee bean grinder an individualized device either just
because it can be set to fine or coarse grind.
The transformational power of stimulation devices is limited
in duration. They certainly change the short-time behavior of
stimulated areas, but long term effects are hard to come by,
even with many sessions of rTMS. Furthermore, stimulation
technologies tend to modify the short-time performance of the
cognitive system more than the structure thereof. Typical effects
users look for and claim to have realized are rather of the “more x”
type, e.g., more creativity, more concentration, more relaxation.
Changes in the mode and structure of cognition tend not to be
sought nor found. Thus, the transformative power of stimulation
technologies now and in the foreseeable future is rather limited.
These eight criteria can and should be supplemented by a
ninth, replaceability. I want to suggest that an artifact is more
integrated into a joint cognitive system, if it cannot be replaced or
can only be replaced by similar artifacts without abandoning the
cognitive process in question. As this criterion plays a dominant
role in the ethical analysis as well as a dimension of integration,
I’ll discuss it in detail below.
With a low score on five applicable criteria and three criteria
simply not relevant for this type of technology, tBS is not a
good candidate for being a proper part of an extended mind.
It even is alien to the typical embedding of our cognition.
As will become apparent in the following, the same result
holds on the additional dimension of replaceability. This second
negative result complements the first: as mentioned above,
situated cognition theses are neither necessary nor sufficient
to establish ethical parity between intracranial carriers of
cognition, extracranial ones, their scaffold or cognitive tools.
Now it turns out, that a major part of new neurotechnologies,
namely transcranial stimulation technologies, are not part of
our extended mind or its scaffold but rather external tools for
modifying mental states. The double negative does not simply
make a positive in this case either. As Levy and Anderson claim,
cognitive technologies and tools can be ethically on par with
neural carriers of cognition, but this neither follows from situated
cognition theses alone, nor is it the case in general. Rather
one will have to analyze the specific composition of neural and
non-neural carriers of a specific cognitive process in order to
evaluate their moral standing, e.g., their worthiness of protection
or whether there might even be a claim for their social provision.
Situated Cognition and Derivative Moral
Value?
If the situated cognition thesis were ethically relevant it should
make a difference for the evaluation of ethical parity under
which specific version of the situated cognition thesis a prop
can be subsumed. It should not merely affect the scope of the
allegedly morally relevant cognitive system: bodily or extrabodily
processes, one would expect it to affect the type of moral value
ascribed. Constitution-based accounts (EC-II or EXC) make the
external processes a real part of the cognitive system, in the
specific case of the cognizing human agent or human-prop
system. As such it would at least be plausible to ascribe it the
primary moral value which human agents have, i.e., participation
in her or his moral status. The causal dependency versions (EC-
I and EMC) in contrast, should leave the external processes as
non-constitutive, i.e., they should accept that the cognizing agent
and its cognitive processes depend on something which is not a
proper part thereof. The moral value which one would expect to
be ascribed to the external prop in this scenario is derivative to
the moral status of the cognizing human agent.
However, this difference between constitution and
dependency-based account does not obtain: all moral value
of tools, scaffolds and even mind extensions is derivative. The
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moral value even of mind-extensions—if there are any—depends
on the extension being a part of a joint cognitive system with
another individual, which enjoys unconditional moral value
independently of the extension. If Otto’s notebook were a
mind extension, it would enjoy moral value only because of
its contribution to the cognitive system notebook-Otto, in
which Otto has moral standing, and Otto has moral standing
independently of his notebook. Otto on the other hand does not
enjoy his moral standing because he contributes to the cognitive
system Otto-notebook. Moral value in this as in all other mind
extension or scaffold cases is asymmetric.
This is why interpretations of embodied cognition theses
cannot add to the moral value of the extracranial carrier or
scaffold of cognition. Embodied cognition theses refer to proper
parts of the cognitive agent’s body. A cognitive agent’s body
already enjoys the highest moral value possible, it need not
be inferred from an embodied cognition hypothesis. The only
additional ethical claims can, therefore, refer to extrabodily
processes, which can have a role as carriers or conditions of
cognitive processes.
Some of our external tools and scaffolds enable or facilitate
cognitive processes in the same way as external carriers of
cognitive processes, and while a token of a specific process
is ongoing, manipulation of the tool will typically disrupt the
cognitive process. Accordingly, their derivative moral value can
be extremely high, such as being the content of an agent’s absolute
claim-right, but it will always be derivative of the moral value of
the cognitive agent himself.
Complementarity and Equivalence
An ethically relevant difference between the diverse external
contributors to cognition can be found in how they are entangled
with the internal contributors in a specific process. Two different
types of entanglement found attention in situated cognition
approaches and in the ethical parity theses: complementarity and
functional equivalence.
Situated cognition as a paradigm of the cognitive sciences
mostly aims at explaining how cognitive processes are realized by
complementary neural and extracranial processes. Only in a few
cases, such as Clark and Chalmers’ example of Otto’s notebook,
did a situated cognition approach focus on external carriers of
cognition which perform the same or an functionally equivalent
task as the intracranial carriers. Even one of the authors of this
example, Clark, assigns priority to non-functionally equivalent
but complementary external resources (cf. Sutton et al., 2010, p.
524 f.). Consequently, the main examples of situated cognition
approaches have been structures in the environment allowing a
reduction of the agent’s cognitive load, or mechanisms in the
body enabling or facilitating processes of cognition.
The ethical parity theses on the other hand aimed at
functionally equivalent neural and extracranial carriers
of cognitive processes17. Prostheses for therapeutic and
enhancement goals that aim to replace or reproduce cognitive
processes usually realized in neural matter have been their
17(For the difference between parity and complementarity-based Extended Mind
theories cf. Sutton, 2010, p. 193 f.)
main topic. The authors behind the ethical parity theses refer
to functional equivalence in their discussion, but turn to
functionally complementary tools in their examples. As already
mentioned, Levy primarily refers to psychopharmaceuticals,
brain stimulation devices, computational devices, such as PDAs,
all of which perform complementary or modifying functions,
not equivalent functions. In the same vein, the examples that
Anderson employs in his introduction of the ethical parity thesis
are not cases of replacement and functional equivalents but
rather cases of complementary functions. His protagonist uses
either a PDA or an implanted device enabling her to hear and
analyze frequencies, which she could not hear with her normal
biological endowments. Therefore, it is likely that Anderson
would agree to extend his ethical parity thesis to functionally
complementary carriers of cognition.
It is, however, at least plausible to think that it does
make an ethical difference whether a external scaffold or
carrier of cognition complements the intracranial carrier or
replaces it within the cognitive agent. Early examples used
by embedded cognition theorists have been structures in our
common environment, such as trajectories and velocities of flying
objects (see Clark’s example of the outfielder above). It is hardly
plausible to formulate ethical parity theses equating the neural
carriers of visual perception in motion and the environment the
perceiving agent moves around in, especially the baseball which
Clark’s outfielder is going to catch (Clark, 1999).
Even after accepting that the moral value of mind extensions
and scaffolds is merely derivative, there still seems to be a huge
gap between the moral value of the outfielders visual and motor
cortex and the fly ball. The fly ball’s moral value—if it has any at
all—is not similar to, if derivative from, that of the outfielder’s
brain. Interfering with the fly ball’s trajectory would merely
violate the rules of the game, interfering with the visual and
motor cortex of the outfielder would likely be a case of criminal
assault.
Thus the ethical parity thesis seems to require either a
limited scope—limited to those external carriers of cognition
which play a functionally equivalent role. Or it is open for
an internal differentiation assigning equivalent ethical value to
functionally equivalent external carriers of cognition and some
type of corresponding ethical value to functionally corresponding
external props. An external prop which fulfills a complementary
role is in most cases irreplaceable in the cognitive process
token. You cannot simply switch the fly ball in mid-run.
Throwing an additional ball into the game would not merely
break the rules, it would confuse the outfielder’s cognitive
process. It often is, however, replaceable in the process type.
Next inning, the outfielder’s cognitive process type will be
complemented by another ball. Functionally equivalent external
props are however often, if not always, intended to work
stably over time and process tokens. Thus, the difference made
by complementarity or functional equivalence might even be
reducible to irreplaceability, as discussed below.
This is one major point in analyzing the moral value of brain
stimulation technologies, such as TMS and tDCS. Most of them,
especially in non-therapeutic settings, perform a complementary
function, thus are not functionally equivalent to internal carriers
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of cognition, if they can be seen as carriers of cognition
at all18.
Replaceability
The inference from an external prop’s role in a cognitive process
to its—always derivative—moral value depends among other
things on the specific role—equivalent or complementary—
played in the process in question. The main characteristic of a
prop’s role is its replaceability. Replaceability can refer to two
distinct but related possibilities: the possibility of immediately
replacing a certain contributor in the ongoing token process
or the possibility of replacing the contributor in future process
tokens of a specific type long-term. It is for example possible to
immediately replace my edition of Aristotle’s works by any other
paginated edition during the process of my counting how often
he used the word “representation.” If you swap the books open
at the same place of the text fast enough I will hardly hesitate.
It is equally possible to replace my use of pencil and paper
for multiplication in the long-term if one provides a number of
ten-sided dice and some time for practice.
With “replaceability” in both cases I refer to real replaceability
here and now. While one can always make up some science
fiction scenario in which some future replacement technology is
possible, that is not what I refer to. Binding replaceability to a
state of development does mean that moral value can change over
time and with technological development. In some future high-
tech scenario the blind man’s cane might be a relic, something
that is extremely limiting and therefore offering it to a blind man
instead of his high-definition, low light and infrared supporting
retina replacements a moral affront. Here and now it is not
an affront but a sensory extension, which it would be morally
blameworthy to interfere with, much less damage or take away.
Replaceability in the long-term is not merely at the heart of
the difference between tool, scaffold and mind extension, it is
at the heart of ethical value as well. Generally, an irreplaceable
contributor to one and the same cognitive process is ceteris
paribusmorally more important than a replaceable one. Because
the loss of an irreplaceable contributor to a cognitive process
often is the loss of an ability of the cognitive agent, it makes
sense to count the external contributor as a part of his cognitive
makeup, his mind.
Thus, if there are external carriers of cognitive processes
which cannot be replaced by either internal carriers or other
external ones, they are the best candidates for a moral value
that is equivalent to, if derivative of the one currently enjoyed
by internal carriers (more on the “currently” below). This
constellation is especially plausible for embodied cognition, as
some bodily carriers, especially in perception, seem as of yet not
18rTMS is approved for treating Major Depressive Disorder in adults who have
not responded to prior antidepressant medications (Perera et al., 2016). In this
setting it seems to restore a function, which the healthy brain typically performs.
While there is obviously a cognitive effect in the treatment of depression, this is
not a counterexample to the complementary character of transcranial stimulation
technologies. rTMS does not perform the function, which the healthy brain would
have performed, thus does not replicate or replace the latters function. Rather it
modifies the brain of the person suffering from depression in such a way that it can
perform the same function as a healthy person’s brain.
to be replaceable, e.g., the ability to modify the visual perspective
by bodily movement. It is harder to think of an example of
embedded cognition with an irreplaceable external contributor.
An external technical carrier of cognition would similarly have
to be irreplaceable by internal carriers or other external carriers
to gain a similar standing. Imagine a cochlea-implant like hearing
aid implanted early in an individual’s life. Let us say it cannot be
replaced later in life for whatever techno-biological reasons. Such
an implant would be just as worthy of protection as a natural
cochlea. A person who had such an implant in his left ear and a
natural grown cochlea in his right would be equally hurt if either
of them were tampered with.
An ability requires an external scaffold, if its performance
requires an external contributor, which however can be replaced
by alternatives of the same or a similar type. The specific scaffold
used in the process token can be replaced without the ability
being lost. These external contributors of cognition will have
more than a modulating role. They are replaceable by other
scaffolds, i.e., the process in question could not take place without
some external contributor to cognition, but it does not have to
be this specific one, maybe not even one closely similar. The
famous notebook of the deeply forgetful Otto seems to belong
into this category, as do pen and paper in long multiplications.
Such a scaffold can either be replaceable by a similar, that is
functionally equivalent or by a non-similar prop. In the latter
case the same cognitive process can be realized by different
combinations of neural matters and external hardware. Otto
needs not have used a notebook, he could—as in the movie
Memento—have taken recourse to tattoos, or, closer to current
therapeutic practice in dementia cases, to imagery, photos,
SenseCam shots.
The remaining external contributors, which can be replaced
by purely internal carriers of the process, are mere tools. These
external carriers of cognition have a merely modulating role in a
cognitive process, i.e., the process in question could and would
take place without them. The specific way it currently takes place,
however, is determined by the props. The use of paper and pencil
in adding sums seem to be such a case. Most people would be
able to add sums without external carriers of cognition, but they
actually do it using a scrap of paper and a pen. If a certain external
carrier of cognition can be replaced by an internal mechanism,
then it is a mere modulating tool.
At the current state of development, tBS technologies belong
in this category of mere tools, if in any of the above. TBS as
an external tool always has a derivative moral value if any.
Its role is complementary, meaning that it is not plausible to
assign it an equivalent moral value to that of the stimulated
neural carriers of cognition. There is of yet no cognitive process
that cannot be realized without the help of tBS, rather tBS
facilitates common cognitive processes, but could—long-term
and sometimes even immediately—be replaced by the inner
workings of neural tissue19.
19In the case of treatment of major depressive disorder via rTMS, this even is
the goal of the procedure. rTMS is not employed in order to alleviate depressive
symptoms during stimulation only. Rather the intention is to modify the activity
of the brain beyond the duration of active stimulation.
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If replaceability makes the difference between tool, scaffold
andmind extensions as well as the difference in moral value, does
that not mean that a situated cognition approach, the extended
mind hypothesis, is back in the ethical boat? Are not mind
extensions morally of the highest importance according to this
argument? This conclusion is suggestive but wrong nevertheless.
It is wrong because firstly the moral value assigned to all of the
external contributors to cognition is still derivative, thus ethical
parity is out of the question from the beginning. Second, that
mind extensions have a stronger moral value than scaffolds or
mere tools does not mean they have the same moral value as an
internal carrier of cognition. While that might come to be the
case—see below—it currently just isn’t. Third, sharing a criterion
does not make a metaphysical and an ethical status any closer
related. That replaceability is one criterion for the integration in a
cognitive system as well as for the moral value of an external prop
does not make the integration into a cognitive system a moral
value or a reason for moral value.
The criterion of replaceability is not an ad hoc suggestion,
suited to external props only, no lex technica. It can be applied to
neural carriers of cognitive processes and doing so reveals some
interesting results. First of all, if ethically less relevantly, there
are some internal carriers of specific cognitive processes which
can be replaced by alternative internal carriers. That typically
happens if functions originally realized by one neural area are
taken over by others after some kind of damage, such as a stroke.
As proper parts of cognitive agents performing the same function
at different points in time, these are more or less obviously
morally on par. What is ethically more interesting, however, is
the change in moral value, which does arise through workable
external replacements. Following Anderson we ought to value
different embodiments of a human being just as we do the average
embodiment, because themain target of respect is not the specific
body but the human being and her cognitive processes. Thus,
with the development of functional external replacements at least
the uniqueness of the moral value of internal carriers of cognition
dissolves.
That does indeed open up a route to ethical parity. The route
to this parity is highlighted by the dimensions of integration
as discussed by Heersmink and the additional dimension of
replaceability: if an external tool does become a closely integrated,
irreplaceable carrier of some cognitive processes, it will be nearly
ethically on par with internal carriers of the same process. The
alteration of either of them would be an assault of the same
gravity on the cognitive life of the agent. It would, however not be
ethically on par in other regards: the internal carriers would still
enjoy the additional protection of a proper part of a human being,
which does not depend on or comes to the same as the protection
of a carrier of cognitive processes. We do not merely protect
the cognitive or mental integrity of humans, we do protect, even
primarily, their bodily integrity.
At the moment most technologies, especially brain
stimulation technologies are far from this state of development.
For brain stimulation technologies it does mean that their
current development path toward more stability, reliability
and specificity, which is in the medical and scientific interest,
will not be sufficient to include them in their user’s extended
mind. Rather the unwieldy tools, which they currently are, will
have to be turned into operationally transparent, constantly
useable devices. What is more, they need to enable cognitive
processes beyond what is possible without them. This is at
the same time what “enhancement” ought to be about and
what makes an external contributor of cognition a morally
relevant object: enabling new or radically improved cognitive
functions.
MORAL VALUE WITHOUT ETHICAL
PARITY WITHOUT SITUATED COGNITION
Note that Levy’s and Anderson’s claim of ethical parity is
merely a negative result itself: it is not the case that the
internal/external distinction as such plays a significant ethical
role in the evaluation of influences on the mind. The parity
thesis does not provide any positive reasons for the evaluation
of specific tools, scaffolds or mind extensions. As mentioned
initially, I share Levy’s and Anderson’s conviction that external
and internal modifications of cognitive and mental states can
be ethically on par. As shown above, this parity is not a
consequence of the situatedness or extension of cognition.
Neither is the metaphysical thesis that external tools are not a
part of the mind suited to guide neuroethics, nor can the opposite
metaphysical interpretation of situated cognition approaches
guide neuroethics. This guidance can only be performed by
specific role of individual tools, scaffolds or extensions in a
specific cognitive process. In this I agree with Levy: “the very
same reasons we have to fear neuroscientific mind reading
and mind control apply, with at least equal force, to existing
techniques, and perhaps even more to new discoveries coming
not from neuroscience but from cognitive and social psychology”
(Levy, 2007a, p. 155).
The same moral reasons can apply to all the components
of a cognitive process, depending on their role in the cognitive
process, but independently of their location, i.e., in the brain, in
the body or in the environment. To that extent the weak ethical
parity thesis, unlike its strong counterpart, holds. However, at
present?, some moral reasons are adequately applied to internal
carriers of cognition and not to external ones. That will only
change if external carriers of cognition become even more deeply
integrated into our cognitive makeup and become irreplaceable
conditions of specific cognitive functions. Even then, however,
the main ethical task will remain open: providing the moral
reasons, reasons appealing to instrumentalisation, to adverse
consequences, to authenticity, to personal identity etc., for
or against a certain manipulation of cognitive processes, by
whatever means.
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